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Abstract 
Using self-reported data from banks in mainland China, I apply a technique used in forensic 
accounting based on Benford’s Law to detect fraudulent manipulation of non-performing loan 
(NPL) figures.  I find large data anomalies consistent with false reporting in mainland banks that 
do not appear in an identically structured survey of Hong Kong banks.  A comparison of 
different types of data from mainland banks shows no statistically significant anomalies in data 
for total deposits from customers, operating expenses, net interest income, or non-interest 
income. 
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1. Introduction 
A generation ago the Chinese financial system was not a significant factor in the world 
economy.  This is clearly no longer true.  As of 2013, the Chinese banking system reported assets 
of 147 trillion Yuan1 or $23.5 trillion2.  This compares to assets held by U.S. banks of $13.8 
trillion.3  If there were to be a large scale collapse of the Chinese banking sector, the 
repercussions would span the globe and have the potential to cause significant economic damage 
to other nations.  The purpose of this paper is to determine if there is an undisclosed vulnerability 
within the Chinese banking system. 
From the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949 until 1978 China had only one bank, 
the People’s Bank of China, which was an organ of the state.  Starting in the late 1970’s the 
government began a modernization of the banking system which included the creation of a series 
of special purpose banks.  This process resulted in the “big four” special purpose banks being 
spun off into theoretically independent commercial banks, although still owned by the 
government.  These were Bank of China (a separate entity from the similarly named People’s 
Bank of China which functions as China’s central bank), China Construction Bank, Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China, and Agricultural Bank of China. 
During the late 1980’s and 1990’s, Chinese banks began a dramatic increase in lending, 
primarily to various state owned enterprises.  These enterprises were commonly not profitable 
and survived through continually refinancing their debt.  Eventually, there were large scale 
defaults (Lardy 1999).  By the late 1990’s, the largest state owned banks were estimated to have 
non-performing loan ratios of 30% (Huang 2006).  In response, in 1998 the Chinese government 
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provided a capital injection of $32.5 billion (Okazaki 2007) which constituted roughly 3% of 
China’s GDP.  In addition, four asset management companies were created to purchase non-
performing loans at face value.  This resulted in an additional $168 billion in capital for the 
banks (Turner, Tan and Sadeghian 2012).  This intervention succeeded in stabilizing the Chinese 
banking system such that as of 2005 the number of commercial banks had increased to 112. 
Starting in the mid-2000’s, there have been a series of anecdotal reports of unusual 
investment activity in China.  Massive construction projects have been completed, but appear to 
sit unused.  The New South China Mall is the largest shopping mall ever constructed.  
Completed in 2005, it spans 7 million square feet of leasable area and has a capacity of 2,000 
stores.  It includes an 80 foot tall replica of the Arc de Triomphe, a mile long canal (with 
gondolas), and full sized indoor roller coaster.  The mall also has fewer than a dozen tenants, 
including four small retail shops and a few fast-food restaurants who are reported to be receiving 
free rent (Donohue 2008).  In Ordos Prefecture, west of Beijing, is the city of Kangbashi.  
Completed in 2008, Kangbashi was designed for a population of between 300,000 and 1 million 
at an estimated cost of 1.1 trillion Yuan, ($161 billion) (Hamlin 2010).  A recent estimate places 
the population of Kangbashi at below 30,000 (Peston 2010).  Multiple other nearly uninhabited 
“ghost cities” across China, have been documented (Krambeck 2010). 
The existence of such large projects that cannot plausibly be servicing their construction 
debt suggests the possibility that China has repeated the financial mistakes of the late 1980’s and 
early 1990’s.  As majority shareholder, the Chinese government has the ability to direct banks’ 
loans to politically beneficial projects that would not be able to obtain financing on the basis of 
financial soundness alone.  But has this actually occurred?  The People’s Bank of China Annual 
Report 2013 states that the non-performing loan ratio (NPL) of major Chinese banks is 1% 
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(People's Bank of China 2013).  This compares to 3.2% in the United States and 7.3% in the 
Euro area (International Monetary Fund 2013).  There is reason to suspect that the claim of a 1% 
NPL ratio may not be accurate.  Multiple research papers have documented serious discrepancies 
in economic data reported by the Chinese government (Sinton 2001), (Holz 2004), (Mehrotra 
2011).  According to a leaked U.S. diplomatic cable, in 2007 then Secretary General of Liaoning 
Province and current Premier of China, Li Keqiang, admitted to U.S. ambassador Clark Randt 
that Chinese GDP statistics were “man-made” and “for reference only" (Minter 2014). 
The motivation for this paper is to determine if large volumes of undisclosed non-
performing loans exist within the Chinese banking system that may pose a threat to the 
international financial system. 
 
2. Data 
Self-reported financial data from mainland Chinese banks and Hong Kong banks was 
obtained from the KPMG Mainland China Banking Survey for the years 2003 through 2011 and 
the KPMG Hong Kong Banking Survey for the years 2006 through 2011.  In this paper I use the 
KPMG reports’ definitions of mainland to be the People’s Republic excluding Hong Kong and 
Macao, and Hong Kong to include Macao.  KPMG is one of the “big four’ international 
accounting firms, based in the Netherlands.  KPMG Advisory (China) Limited describes itself as 
“a wholly foreign owned enterprise in China and KPMG Huazhen (Special General 
Partnership), a special general partnership in China, are member firms of the KPMG network of 
independent member firms affiliated with KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG 
International”), a Swiss entity.” 
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The banking surveys include data on 197 mainland Chinese banks and 142 Hong Kong 
banks, listed in appendix 1, although not all banks are represented in each annual survey.  Data is 
reported in local currency units, i.e. Yuan and Hong Kong Dollars respectively.  The number of 
banks included in each report are shown in tables 1 and 2.  The Hong Kong banking survey was 
not issued in 2010. 
 
Table 1.  Number of banks included in each KPMG Banking Survey 
Year Mainland Hong Kong 
2003 18 - 
2004 20 - 
2005 55 - 
2006 66 139 
2007 112 105 
2008 121 136 
2009 135 142 
2010 111 - 
2011 114 59 
 
 
Six variables were chosen for analysis: Net Interest Income, Noninterest income, 
Operating expenses, Total assets, Total deposits from customers, and Gross NPLs.  Having a 
survey available for both groups of banks using a common methodology is fortuitous in that it 
avoids the possible introduction of error due to differing definitions of each variable. 
 
3. Methods 
To defect fraudulent data manipulation, I compare the frequency of leading digits in 
banking data to the distribution predicted by Benford's Law.  This is a technique suggested by 
Hal Varian (Varian 1972) and is currently used in forensic accounting (Nigrini and Mittermaier 
1997).  Benford's Law is the observation that data produced by most processes, including most 
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financial data, has a distribution of digits that is not uniform.  For example, in a random sample 
of checking account balances the leading digit will be 1 about 30% of the time and 9 about 5% of 
the time.  The distribution of leading digits predicted by Benford’s Law is shown in figure 1.  
 
 
 
In the late 19th century, astronomer Simon Newcomb noticed that the front pages of a 
book of logarithm tables was more worn than the back pages.  The tables in the book were 
arranged in increasing numerical order so he concluded that lower digits like 1 or 2 were being 
looked up more frequently than higher digits like 8 or 9.  Based on this observation, he published 
“Note on the Frequency of Use of the Different Digits in Natural Numbers” (Newcomb 1881).  
The same observation was made half a century later by physicist Frank Benford who published 
an analysis of 20,000 numbers drawn from sources as varied as atomic weights of elements, 
surface areas of rivers, and figures appearing in Reader’s Digest finding that they all conformed 
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to a particular distribution (Benford 1938).  The probability of a digit d ∈ {1…9} being the 
leading digit in a group of numbers conforming to Benford’s Law is 𝑃(𝑑) = log10 (1 + 1𝑑)                                                                   (1) 
The use of Benford’s Law as a tool for detecting fraud in forensic accounting is well 
established.  In 1988, Charles Carslaw used deviations from the Benford distribution to detect 
anomalies in deposits by firms in New Zealand (Carslaw 1998).  One year later Jacob Thomas 
successfully applied the same technique to data on U.S. firms (Thomas 1989).  A standardized 
process for using Benford’s Law in accounting fraud investigations was published by Mark 
Nigrini and Linda Mittermaeir (Nigrini and Mittermaier 1997).  The applicability of a Benford 
based analysis to public sector data was tested by Rauch, Göttsche, Brähler, and Engel in a study 
of fiscal data provided by the Greek government to the European Union.  After the fraudulent 
nature of their fiscal reports was discovered in the wake of the Greek economic collapse, their 
data was observed to depart significantly from a Benford distribution (Rauch, et al. 2011). 
The proof of the mechanism underlying Benford’s Law was published by Theordore Hill 
(Hill 1995) and provides insight on what types of data should follow a Benford distribution.  Hill 
showed that when numbers are drawn randomly from multiple randomly selected distributions 
and are combined through common mathematical operations, the resulting distribution will 
approach the Benford’s Law distribution as the sample size goes to infinity.  Since most financial 
data is produced by combining numbers from different sources through common mathematical 
operations, the resulting data can be expected to display a Benford distribution. 
Understanding the mechanism of the Benford distribution provides guidance on what 
types of financial data should not be expected to conform, as well as those that should.  Numbers 
that have no interval meaning, such as phone numbers or zip codes, typically will not conform to 
[8] 
 
a Benford distribution.  In addition, data that is constrained by imposed maximums or minimums 
will not conform.  Examples of this type of data are the heights of adults measured in feet, where 
numbers below 3 will be rare and 9 will not occur.  Also, financial records that exclude 
transactions over $50 would under represent digits 6 through 9.  In general, numbers that are 
assigned in part through the application of human judgment will deviate from a Benford 
distribution.  Such a deviation can therefore only be interpreted as indicative of fraud within the 
context of the claimed data generating process. 
Even if substantial fraudulent manipulation of a data set has occurred, there may not be a 
resultant deviation from Benford depending on the specific type of alteration.  For example, if a 
fraction of transactions are deleted at random to reduce a total then the remaining transactions 
will not have an altered digit frequency.  If the fraudulent entries are large in amount but few in 
number they will not introduce a distributional deviation proportional to their economic impact.  
Also, very small data sets or ones that do not span several orders of magnitude are not 
appropriate for a Benford based analysis (Singleton 2011).   
If a data set is judged an appropriate subject for a Benford based analysis, a statistical test 
must be selected.  There are three main options: a z-test applied to each digit individually, a chi-
square test applied to digits collectively, and a Bayesian approach.  All three are described in 
detail by Durtsch, Hillison, and Pacini (Durtsch, Hillison and Pacini 2004).  Based on their 
assessment of relative merits, here I use a chi-square test because it has a lower false positive rate 
than a digit by digit analysis and requires less data than the Bayesian technique. 
I analyze four groups of data in sequence.  First, to determine if there is a deviation 
overall in the mainland NPL data, I create a sample consisting of the reported NPL volume for 
every mainland bank across all years in the KPMG mainland China surveys (2003 through 
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2011).  I extract the leading digit of each value and define a null hypothesis that there is no 
statistically significant difference between the counts of digits in this sample and the counts 
predicted by a Benford distribution.  I use a chi-square goodness of fit test to produce a p-value 
to test this hypothesis at the 5% significance level.  Second, to exclude the possibility that the 
results of the initial test are a ubiquitous feature of banking data, I repeat this procedure using 
NPL volume data for every Hong Kong bank across all years in the KMPG Hong Kong surveys 
(2006 through 2011).  Third, to exclude the possibility that the result of the mainland banks NPL 
data analysis is a general feature of all Chinese banking data, and based on the assumption that 
different categories of data will present different incentives for fraudulent manipulation, I chose 
five additional non-NPL variables across all years of the mainland surveys and repeated this 
procedure separately on each.  Fourth, to detect any trend over time in fraudulent NPL reporting, 
I repeat the initial procedure separately by year on mainland banks NPL figures for the years 
2006 through 2011.  2003 through 2005 are excluded from this fourth analysis on the basis that 
there are an insufficient number of banks surveyed in these years4. 
 
4. Results 
The first test, which combines all mainland banks NPL figures shows a difference 
between the observed and predicted counts that is significant at α = 0.01. 𝜒2(8, 𝑁 = 659) =29.27, 𝑝 = 0.0003.   The relative frequency of leading digits is displayed in figure 2.  Summary 
statistics for all mainland NPL data is shown in table 2. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics for 
mainland NPL data 
N 659 
Mean 6141.19 
Median 279 
Standard Dev. 36166.94 
Minimum 1 
Maximum 818853 
 
 
The second test repeats the first using Hong Kong banking NPL data for years 2006 
through 2011.  This analysis did not show a statistically significant difference between the counts 
of first digits in the sample and the counts predicted by a Benford distribution.  𝜒2(8, 𝑁 =256) = 7.07, 𝑝 = 0.5291.  The relative frequency of leading digits is displayed in figure 3.  
Summary statistics for all Hong Kong NPL data is shown in table 3. 
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Table 3. Summary statistics 
for Hong Kong NPL data 
N 256 
Mean 999.63 
Median 45.50 
Standard Dev. 4285.09 
Minimum 1 
Maximum 22796 
 
The third test compares mainland NPL deviations from deviations in four other mainland 
variables, for years 2003 through 2011.  The results are shown in table 4. 
 
Table 4. Comparison of mainland variables 
Variable 2 statistic P-value 
NPL 29.27 0.00 
Total assets 18.38 0.02 
Total deposits from customers 10.40 0.24 
Operating expenses 6.71 0.57 
Net Interest Income 6.61 0.58 
Non-interest income 3.24 0.92 
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The fourth test calculates the deviation in mainland NPL data from the predicted 
distribution for each year individually.  The 2 statistics and p-values are listed in table 5 and 
plotted in figure 4.  
 
Table 5. Deviations of mainland NPL data over time 
Year Χ2 statistic P-value 
2007 8.70 0.3682 
2008 20.45 0.0088 
2009 9.58 0.2958 
2010 12.60 0.1264 
2011 14.86 0.0619 
 
 
 
 
5. Discussion 
The test of NPL data for mainland banks across all years in the survey shows a very 
significant departure from the expected Benford distribution.  In addition, the deviation manifests 
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itself in a deficiency of 1’s and an excess of 8’s and 9’s.  This suggests that the data generating 
process avoids crossing the threshold where another digit would be added.  An example would 
be recording a value of 1,000 as 900 or 800.  A similar pattern, although less pronounced, is seen 
at the transition between 4 and 5 with more 4’s and fewer 5’s than predicted.  An analogous 
example would be recording values of 500 as 400.  The psychological significance of 
transitioning from a number of n digits in length to n+1 digits in length is obvious, as the routine 
practice of pricing consumer products at $9.99 rather than $10.00 will attest.  A similar, and 
consistent with the results, lesser psychological barrier occurs between $4.99 and $5.00.  
Psychology, however is not the only explanation consistent with this data.  Auditing or other 
bureaucratic triggers are more likely to be set at these round numbers than at others.  Systematic 
avoidance of such trigger thresholds is also a reasonable explanation for the results.   
The Hong Kong NPL data shows does not exhibit a statistically significant analogous 
pattern.  This suggests that the anomalies found in the mainland banks’ NPL figures is not a 
normal product of the accounting process.  An internal comparison of mainland NPL figures to 
five additional mainland variables shows NPL data to have by far the largest deviation from the 
predicted distribution.  However, while total deposits from customers, operating expenses, net 
interest income, and non-interest income did not show a statistically significant departure from 
Benford, data for total assets did.  It is interesting to note that the p-values have an inverse 
relationship with what could reasonably be described as the political and financial sensitivity of 
the variable, i.e. non-performing loans show the highest deviation, total assets next highest, 
followed by deposits, interest income, and finally the mundane data on net operating expenses. 
Charting the p-value of the χ2 goodness of fit test for each year individually is hampered 
by the smaller number of observations than exists in the data across all years.  Tests on 2003 
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through 2006 were not conducted because the number of mainland banks participating in the 
early years of the survey was so small.  Even with these limitations, an obvious pattern in 
evident.  The first year of the great recession, 2008, shows a dramatic increase in deviation from 
predicted NPL values, represented by a sharp drop of the test p-values from 0.37 down to below 
0.01.  This is consistent with an increase in false financial reporting to compensate for a 
worsening of banks’ balance sheets. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Using self-reported data from banks in mainland China, I apply a technique used in 
forensic accounting based on Benford’s Law to detect fraudulent manipulation of non-
performing loan (NPL) figures.  I find large data anomalies consistent with false reporting in 
mainland banks that do not appear in an identically structured survey of Hong Kong banks.  A 
comparison of different types of data from mainland banks shows no statistically significant 
anomalies in data for total deposits from customers, operating expenses, net interest income, or 
non-interest income, but total assets figures do show a significant anomaly although of smaller 
scale than that found in NPL data.  Finally, an analysis of NPL data across the period 2007 
through 2011 shows a sharp spike upwards in level of anomaly in 2008, the first year of the great 
recession. 
Given that these anomalies appear in mainland Chinese banks, but not in Hong Kong 
banks, and that their magnitude corresponds to the political and financial sensitivity of the data 
type, it is difficult to imagine a plausible data generating mechanism other than deliberate fraud.  
Since human nature is such that people tend not to hide good news, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the volume of non-performing loans held on the balance sheets of mainland Chinese banks is 
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significantly larger than claimed.  Perhaps most troubling for the world economy is that the blind 
spot created by the attempt to conceal the true volume of NPL’s is growing. 
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Appendix 1. 
KPMG Mainland China Banking Survey List 
 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China 
China Construction Bank 
Corporation 
Bank of China 
Agricultural Bank of China 
China Development Bank 
Corporation 
Bank of Communications 
China Merchants Bank 
China CITIC Bank Corporation 
Shanghai Pudong Development 
Bank 
Industrial Bank 
China Minsheng Banking 
Corporation 
Agricultural Development Bank of 
China 
China Everbright Bank 
Shenzhen Development Bank 
Hua Xia Bank 
The ExportImport Bank of China 
Bank of Beijing 
China Guangfa Bank 
Bank of Shanghai 
Bank of Jiangsu 
Evergrowing Bank 
Beijing Rural Commercial Bank 
Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank 
China Bohai Bank 
Shanghai Rural Commercial Bank 
China Zheshang Bank 
Ping An Bank 
Bank of Nanjing 
Guangzhou Rural Commercial Bank 
HSBC Bank (China) 
Bank of Ningbo 
Huishang Bank Corporation 
Bank of Hangzhou 
Bank of Tianjin 
Shengjing Bank 
Bank of Guangzhou 
Harbin Bank 
Bank of Dalian 
Baoshang Bank 
Bank of Chengdu 
The Bank of East Asia (China) 
Standard Chartered Bank (China) 
Longjiang Bank Corporation 
Tianjin Rural Commercial Bank 
Hankou Bank 
Foshan Shunde Rural Commercial 
Bank 
Bank of Kunlun 
Citibank (China) 
Bank of Chongqing 
Bank of Changsha 
Bank of Dongguan 
Bank of TokyoMistibushi UFJ 
(China) 
Guangxi Beibu Gulf Bank 
Bank of Hebei 
Bank of Jinzhou 
Xiamen International Bank 
Huarong Xiangjiang Bank 
Corporation 
Bank of Xi'an 
Hangzhou United Rural Commercial 
Bank 
Wuhan Rural Commercial Bank 
Bank of Nanchang 
DBS Bank (China) 
Guangdong Nanyue Bank 
Bank of Suzhou 
Fudian Bank 
Bank of Guiyang 
Mizuho Corporate Bank (China) 
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking 
Corporation (China) 
Jinshang Bank 
Bank of Qingdao 
Hang Seng Bank (China) 
Nanchong City Commercial Bank 
Bank of Lanzhou 
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Bank of Zhengzhou 
Nanhai Rural Commercial Bank 
Jiangsu Changshu Rural Commercial 
Bank 
Jiangsu Zhangjiagang Rural 
Commercial Bank 
Xiamen Bank 
Nanyang Commercial Bank (China) 
Zhejiang Xiaoshan Rural 
Cooperative Bank 
Bank of Wenzhou 
Bank of Jiujiang 
Bank of Luoyang 
Zhejiang Chouzhou Commercial 
Bank 
Fujian Haixia Bank 
Chongqing Three Gorges Bank 
Ningbo Yinzhou Rural Cooperative 
Bank 
Jiangsu Jinagyin Rural Commercial 
Bank 
Weihai City Commercial Bank 
Bank of Ningxia 
Jiangsu Wujiang Rural Commercial 
Bank 
Bank of Yingkou 
Bank of Taizhou 
Deutsche Bank (China) 
OCBC Bank (China) 
Bank of Liuzhou 
Chang’an Bank 
Bank of Anshan 
Bank of Ganzhou 
Zhejiang Tailong Commercial Bank 
Bank of Inner Mongolia 
China Resources Bank of Zhuhai 
Bank of Weifang 
Bank of Liaoyang 
Panzhihua City Commercial Bank 
Guilin Bank 
Chinese Mercantile Bank 
Qishang Bank 
Zhejiang Mintai Commercial Bank 
First Sino Bank 
BNP Paribas (China) 
Jiangsu Kunshan Rural Commercial 
Bank 
Bank of Rizhao 
Bank of Shaoxing 
Bank of Deyang 
Ningbo Cixi Rural Cooperative Bank 
Bank of Fuxin 
Zhangjiakou City Commercial Bank 
United Overseas Bank (China) 
Zhejiang Hangzhou Yuhang Rural 
Cooperative 
Laishang Bank 
Bank of Handan 
JP Morgan Chase Bank (China) 
Wing Hang Bank (China) 
Australia and New Zealand Bank 
(China) 
Bank of Jiaxing 
Bank of Jinhua 
Bank of Cangzhou 
Jiangmen Xinhui Rural Commercial 
Bank 
Bank of Xingtai 
Dongying City Commercial Bank 
Mianyang City Commercial Bank 
 
 
KPMG Hong Kong Banking Survey List 
 
Bank of China (Hong Kong) 
Bank of East Asia (The) 
China Construction Bank (Asia) 
Corporation 
Chiyu Banking Corporation 
Chong Hing Bank 
Citibank (Hong Kong) 
CITIC Bank International N1 
Dah Sing Bank 
DBS Bank (Hong Kong) 
Fubon Bank (Hong Kong) 
Hang Seng Bank 
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation (The) 
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Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
Ch (Asia) 
MEVAS Bank 
Nanyang Commercial Bank 
Public Bank (Hong Kong) 
Shanghai Commercial Bank 
Standard Bank Asia 
Standard Chartered Bank (Hong 
Kong) 
Tai Sang Bank 
Tai Yau Bank 
Wing Hang Bank 
Wing Lung Bank 
Allied Banking Corporation (Hong 
Kong) 
Banc of America Securities Asia 
Bank of Ch International 
Ch Construction Bank (Asia) Fnce 
N1 
Citicorp International 
GE Capital (Hong Kong) 
J.P. Morgan Securities (Asia Pacifi 
c) 
KDB Asia 
Kookmin Bank Hong Kong 
Mitsubishi UFJ Securities (HK) 
Capital 
ORIX Asia 
Scotiabank (Hong Kong) 
Societe Generale Asia 
UBAF (Hong Kong) 
Argo Enterprises 
BCOM Fnce (Hong Kong) 
BPI International Fnce 
Chau's Brothers Fnce 
Chong Hing Fnce 
Commonwealth Fnce Corporation 
Corporate Fnce (D.T.C.) 
Fubon Credit (Hong Kong) 
Gunma Fnce (Hong Kong) 
Habib Fnce International 
Hachijuni Asia 
HBZ Fnce 
Henderson International Fnce N1 
HKCB Fnce 
Hung Kai Fnce 
Inchroy Credit Corporation 
KEB Asia Fnce N2 
KEXIM ASIA 
Octopus Cards 
Orient First Capital 
PrimeCredit 
Public Fnce 
Shinhan Asia 
Sumitomo Trust Fnce (H.K.) (The) 
Vietnam Fnce 
Wing Hang Fnce 
Wing Lung Fnce 
Woori Global Markets Asia 
Agricultural Bank of Ch 
Australia and New Zealand Banking 
Group 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 
Banco Santander 
Bangkok Bank Public Company 
Bank of America 
Bank of Communications 
Bank of India 
Bank of New York Mellon (The) 
Bank of Nova Scotia (The) 
Bank of Scotland 
Bank of Taiwan 
Bank of TokyoMitsubishi UFJ (The) 
Bank SinoPac 
Barclays Bank 
Bayerische Landesbank 
BNP Paribas 
BNP Paribas Securities Services N1 
BNP Paribas Wealth Management 
Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce 
Cathay United Bank 
Chang Hwa Commercial Bank 
Ch Construction Bank Corporation 
Ch Merchants Bank 
Chtrust Commercial Bank 
Citibank 
Commerzbank 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
Coöperatieve Centrale 
RaiffeisenBoerenleenbank 
[21] 
 
Crédit Agricole Corporate and 
Investment Bank N2 
Credit Suisse 
DBS Bank 
Deutsche Bank 
DZ Bank 
E.Sun Commercial Bank 
EFG Bank 
Erste Group Bank 
First Commercial Bank 
Fortis Bank 
Hana Bank 
HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) 
Hua Nan Commercial Bank 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
Ch 
ING Bank 
Intesa Sanpaolo 
JPMorgan Chase Bank 
KBC Bank 
Korea Exchange Bank 
Malayan Banking Berhad 
Mega International Commercial 
Bank 
Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking 
Corporation 
Mizuho Corporate Bank 
National Australia Bank 
Natixis 
Newedge Group 
OverseaChinese Banking 
Corporation 
RBS Coutts Bank 
Royal Bank of Canada 
Royal Bank of Scotland N.V. N3 
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc 
Siam Commercial Bank (The) 
Société Générale 
Société Générale Bank and Trust 
State Bank of India 
State Street Bank and Trust 
Company 
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking 
Corporation 
Taipei Fubon Commercial Bank 
Taishin International Bank 
UBS 
UCO Bank 
UniCredit Bank N4 
United Commercial Bank N5 
United Overseas Bank 
WestLB 
Westpac Banking Corporation 
Woori Bank 
